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[Crim. No. 5816. In Bank. May 4, 1956.) 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. DOROTHY 
DIXON, Appellant. 
[1] Powons-Possession of Narcotics-Evidence.-A judgment of 
conviction of illegal possession of narcotics will not be reversed 
on the ground that the narcotics were found only after a 
garage key was forcibly taken from defendant where no more 
force was used than was reasonably necessary to take the key 
from her hand. 
[2] Criminal Law-Evidence-Evidence .Obtained b7 Unlawful 
Seizure.-Where it appears from an officer's own testimony 
that he and· other officers had no warrant for a search of 
defendant's apartment or of a garage, the key to which was 
taken from defendant's possession, and where there was no 
evidence to justify their entry, arrest and search, evidence 
obtained as a result of such search should be excluded. 
[3] Id. - Evidence - Evidence Obtained b7 tJDlawful Seizure.-
Where defendant's testimony that her landlord forced her to 
keep the narcotic found in an apartment garage, the key to 
which was taken from her by arresting officers entering her 
apartment without a warrant, was impelled by the erroneous 
adnlission of illegally obtained evidence, such testimony can-
not be segregated from the Hlcgnllyobtained evidence to sus-
tain a judgment of conviction. 
[2] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 127; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 393 
et seq. 
McE:. Dig. References: [1] Poisons, § 14; [2, 3] Criminal Law, 
§ 410; [4] Searches and Seizures, § 1. 
• Aaaigned by Chairman of Judicial Couneil. 
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[4] Searches and Seizures-Legality.-If reasonable cause is shown 
for the entry of defendnnt's npartment and her arrest (Pen. 
Code, §§ 836, 844), the contemporaneous search of an apart-
ment garage, the key to which was taken frOID her possession 
by the officers, would be a lawful search as an incident to that 
arrest, since .the garage was on the premises and under 
defendant's controL 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Clement D. Nye, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for illegal possession of heroin. Judgment of 
conviction reversed. 
Dorothy Dixon, in pro. per., John H. Marshall and Henry 
S. Rupp for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered after the court sitting without a jury found 
her guilty of one count of possessing heroin. (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11500.) She also appeals from an order denying 
her motion for a new trial. 
Defendant resided in a court apartment rented from Ra-
mona Lopez, who occupied another apartment of the same 
court. Sometime during the evening of November 29, 1954, 
Officer 0 'Grady of the Narcotic Division of the Los Angeles 
Police Department entered and searched the apartment of 
Mrs. Lopez but failed to find any narcotics or substances com-
monly used in cutting them. 
Thereafter, at about 10 :30 p. m., Officer O'Grady, accom-
panied by Officer Kenne9-Y and State Narcotics Inspector 
Wells, entered defendant's apartment, placed her under 
arrest, and told her to remain seated on the bed while they 
searched her apartment. They did not have a warrant. In 
defendant's kitchen cupboard they found an opened carton 
of milk sugar, which is used to cut heroin. Officer O'Grady 
testified that defendant appeared extremely nervous and on 
several occasions got up and "wandered around" the room 
while the officers were searching it. He told her that if she 
did not remain seated until they finished, it would be neces-
sary to handcuff her. She insisted on going to the bathroom 
and told him that she bad recently aborted herself and that 
) 
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she was "having difficulties." He offered to ea11 a 
for her if one was necessary or to see that she received 
cal attention before going to jail. As he turned his 
she took something from the upper part of her dress. 
ordered her to hand it to him, and when she refused 
made a motion to place it in her mouth, he and the 
officers seized her arms to keep the object from her 
She kicked one of the officers, and in the ensuing IIJ;rUll'Il'If'!1 
they lifted her onto the bed and forced a key from her 
She admitted that it was the key to one of the Ant."hnA9I,tl 
garages rented by her. Officer O'Grady and Inspector 
entered the garage and found 10 latex bags containing 
rations of heroin that had been cut with milk sugar. 
ant produced keys to two other garages. In one of 
the officers found a box of empty capsules. 
People's case was submitted on the testimony in the 
script of the preliminary hearing and the exhibits received 
that hearing including the heroin, capsules, and milk 
[1] Her contention that the judgment must be "A..,,._.,,, 
on the basis of Bochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [72 
205, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1896], because the narcotics I 
were found only· after the garage key was forcibly taken' 
from her is without merit. The brutal and shocking force 
condemned in that case was not present here; no more force 
was used than was reasonably necessary to take the key;. 
from her hand. :i 
[~] It follows, however, from the officer's own testimony i 
that they had no warrant and from the absence of anY.J 
evidence to justify their entry, arrest, and seareb that the1 
evidence was illegally obtained and should therefore have; 
been excluded. (People v. Cahan, 44 Ca1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 
905]; Badillo v. Superior Court, ante, p. 269 [294 P.2<l 
23].) [3] Defendant's testimony in explanation of her pos-
session of the narcotic that Mrs. Lopez forced her to keep it 
revealed that she knowingly possessed it. This testimony, 
however, was impelled by the erroneous admission of the 
illegally obtained evidence and cannot be segregated from 
that evidence to IUStain the judgment. (Silverthorne L'br. 
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 [40 S.Ct. 182, 64 
L.Ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 1426] ; People v. Berger, 44 Cal.2d 459, 
462 [282 P.2d 509] ; Badillo v. Superior Courl, rupra, ante, 
p.269.) 
[4] It remains only to add for the guidance of the trial 
court (Code Oiv. Proc., § 53) that if on a new trial reason-
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able cause is shown for the entry of defendant's apartment 
and her arrest (Pen. Code, §§ 836, 844; see Peop~e v. Marlin, 
45 Ca1.2d 755, 762 [290 P.2d 855) ; People v. Maddox, IInte, 
p. 301 [294 P.2d 6] ; Willson v. Superior Court, ante, p. 291 
[294 P.2d 36)), the contemporaneous search of the garage, 
would be a lawful search as an incident to that arrest since 
the garage was on the premises and under defendant's control. 
(See United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 361, 363-364; KeUey v. 
United States, 61 F.2d 843, 846-847 [86 A.L.R. 338] ; Dt,De~~o 
v. United States, 19 F.2d 749, 750-751; United Statu v. 
Charles, 8 F.2d 302; Fryar v. United Staies, 3 F.2d 598-
599; Sayers v. United States, 2 F.2d 146, 147-148; Stafe v. 
Estes, 151 Wasb. 51 [274 P. 1053, 1054) ; cl. Agnello v. United 
States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 [46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145, 51 A.L.R. 
409] ; Application of Rose, 32 F.Supp. 103, 104; Peop~ v. 
Gorg, 45 Ca1.2d 776, 782 [291 P.2d 469].) 
The judgment and order are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of reversal but 
prefer to base my concurrence upon the legal proposition 
that the conduct of the law enforcement officers here not only 
amounted to a violation of defendant's right of privacy 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States and section 19 of article I of the Constitu-
tion of California but also amounted to a denial of due 
process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
case of Rochin v. CaUlorm'a, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 205, 96 
L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396]. 
SPENCE, J.-I dissent. 
The record clearly shows that defendant had committed 
and was committing a felony at the time of her arrest. I am 
therefore of the opinion that the arrest was lawful (Pen. 
Code, § 836, subd. 2); that the search made as an incident 
of that arrest was a reasonable search; and that the evidence 
obtained as the result of such search was properly admitted. 
(See dissenting opinion in Badillo v. Superior Court, IInte, 
pp. 269, 273 [294 P.2d 23].) I would affirm the judgment 
and the order denying a new trial. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
